Rpf Agreement

The Arusha agreement provided for the establishment of a large-scale transitional government (BBTG) [2], which should be set up by the insurgent RPF and the five political parties which, since April 1992, had set up a transitional government pending the general elections. The agreements contained other points deemed necessary for a lasting peace: the rule of law, the repatriation of refugees through both struggle and power-sharing agreements, and the merging of government and rebel armies. The talks, intended to negotiate power-sharing between the rebels and the Rwandan government, resulted in an agreement that favored the Rwandan Patriotic Front due to disagreements within the government. The government delegation was led by opposition Foreign Minister Boniface Ngulinzira (MDR) until President Habyarimana replaced him with Defence Minister James Gasana (MRND) in January 1993. [5] The Arusha Agreement removed many powers from the post of president and transferred them to the transitional government. In a speech on 15 November 1992, Habyarimana called the Arusha Accords “pieces of paper” and mocked his opponents who had avoided elections. After AndrĂ© Guichaoua. This did not reflect opposition to the peace agreements as such: the agreement also destabilized many soldiers who feared a general demobilization following the military merger provided for in the agreement. This goes a long way in explaining the genocide that followed the following year.

[7] On April 6, 4, 1994, the plane was shot down by Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira (also a Hutu) as it was on its way to Kigali airport. The responsibility for the attack is the fight, with Hutu extremists and the RPF suspected. The attack was a catalyst for the Rwandan genocide. It was one of many attacks that took place with similar political motivations, with moderates targeted by the CDR, the hard-line group, which was once part of the MRND. UNAMIR soldiers were present before, during and after the violence. The restrictions imposed by the United Nations due to national sovereignty and the need to remain impartial in the execution of chapter 6 peacekeeping operations have led the MISSION to do more than bear witness to the genocide. After the death of ten Belgian soldiers in April 1994, the Belgian contingent was withdrawn from Rwanda and the size of the mission was reduced to about 270 men. International powers like France, Britain, and the United States did not have the political motivation to send troops or financial support to UNAMIR, although many of these countries were able to keep their foreigners away from danger. .

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